This post is a follow-up on David Selini’s “The Untapped Potential of Wrong-Footed Full-Backs” and I would advise reading that beforehand if possible.
The concept of overloading to isolate is predicated on the available creation of central routes of access, preferably progressive or lateral in orientation to continue the period of transition and expose opposition ball-sidedness. Thus far this season, Manchester City have excellently executed this key attacking tenet of positional play, predominately through their use of João Cancelo as a left back and the general commitment to overloading the left wide and half-spaces. Their underlaps breach the final line of defence, which provokes the defensive state of retreat subsequently requiring adaptation to the introduction of new vertical space. To maintain compactness under these circumstances the sacrificing of coverage in deeper zones is required, thus allowing the players who sit deeper additional time and space in possession. Enter Cancelo.
Practical:
This theme I think was best highlighted in their match against Chelsea. Firstly, however, a few prefacing remarks which provide the structure for the rest of the analysis are needed. Briefly, Chelsea’s defensive structure functions something approximating the back 5 who take up largely man-oriented roles, tracking their respective player whilst they occupy their zone, following them deeper to compensate for any space in between the lines and prevent progression. Secondly, the ball-side wide midfielder is responsible for pressing the opposition’s full back from consolidated higher periods of possession where constrainment is less easily achievable, contrasted to high pressing from goal kicks for example where wing-back to full-back orientation is seen.
Thus, pinning was a key concept for Manchester City as it allowed them to sustain pressure. Through using the centre backs for circulation to exploit the lack of high pressing forward coverage by Chelsea, they maintained a strong high and wide presence which created a positive feedback loop where said presence prevented Chelsea from preventing that presence (within the confines of their system) because it would expose too much space in dangerous regions.
The first instance of effective overloading occurred just 2 minutes into the game where, Bernardo, incidentally, using his (stronger) left foot from the right to allow for central access finds the far-sided centre back Aymeric Laporte, free as the previous action of circulation had the effective of provoking Chelsea dropping deeper.
Cancelo after receiving, recycles backwards as Romelu Lukaku has cut central access via his deeper positioning on Laporte while Chelsea’s proximity to their respective markers prevents any progressive interplay from occurring.
However, this is where the wonders of Pep Guardiola come to the fore. Cancelo and Jack Grealish engage in a horizontal rotation. This rotation exemplifies the utility of the 7-zone model which adapts the concepts of positional play around predictable opposition responses to ball-sidedness. By which I mean it allows for the occurrence of similar dynamics and optimal spacing as the 5-zone model, while functioning on the condensed pitch, essentially moving the parameters for more effective implementation. What makes good spacing when the pitch is expanded via central possession alters when the pitch condenses; hence, adaptation to ensure strong connections without positional overlap is helpful. The 7-zone model in some interpretations could never fully effectively integrate all 7 zones simultaneously, because, at least in my conceptualisation, it serves ball-sidedness, hence, the half-space/wing split occurs only on one flank which fluctuates dependant on the ball as a reference point meaning there are 6 active zones because it is only pertinent that the far-side occupy the half-space classical and wing while providing central support. The fact Grealish and Cancelo are fundamentally in different channels here is exemplified by the subtle movement which allows Cancelo to evade his marker N’Golo Kanté, creating reception space for himself while Grealish nonetheless discombobulates through drawing Reece James narrower in accordance with the man-oriented defensive scheme as Grealish cannot effectively be ‘passed on’ in the typical manner of zonal-man orientation due to the high half-space presence of Kevin De Bruyne occupying César Azpilicueta.
City through this subtle movement have created a predicament for Chelsea’s man-orientation. N’Golo Kanté cannot track Cancelo because it opens too much space in between the lines for one of the many dropping players in the half-spaces and allows for more penetrative central access as it would open the passing lane to Rodri to receive, previously covered by the cover shadow of Chelsea’s first line attackers. Thus, because of the dynamic superiority conferred by giving time and space to the centre backs, City have manufactured a situation where a small window must be open for either Grealish – which because of the Rodri potential is too dangerous, or Cancelo, the less directly dangerous option to be open to receive a pass.
James belatedly jumps after Chelsea reconfigure, with Cancelo able to receive inside facing the centre which is has been discombobulated by the underlap of Grealish, dragging now Azpilicueta and De Bruyne occupying the attention of Jorginho, conferred responsibility to compensate for the overload due to Kante’s positional importance prior.
Cancelo can now drive inwards towards the centre to exploit the confused space. Phil Foden uses the dynamic superiority to now drop ahead of his reactive marker Andreas Christensen. Even without Phil Foden’s ethereal majesty in possession which allows him to exploit ephemeral instances, a link pass to Rodri to access the far-side was the option.
Overall, this sequence shows how patient possession can be used to manufacture circumstances where positional manipulation is possible through generating enough time and space for receivers to find the incisive pass. While moreover highlighting the utility of having Cancelo moving inside because the pockets found will be central which allows for more direct infiltration and access to an underloaded flank.
Theoretical:
I think there is an overlap (ironically considering the manoeuvre is somewhat antithetical to the nature of the principle espoused) between the thought processes of Thomas Tuchel and Pep Guardiola here, as prior to the Champions League final access was given to training where Tuchel used a narrowing pitch from the centre which seems predicated on prioritising central infiltration from wide areas rather than running down a cul-de-sac and being constrained or more optimistically, potentially getting a cross in from a wider area.
The idea of wanting central control and to avoid the constraining effect of the touchline are therefore not revolutionary; a central focus being a key tenet of basic positional play. Despite this, right footed left backs and vice versa remain so unexplored David Selini referred to them as ‘wrong-footed’. And I do not think this is necessarily wrong, because it is the easiest way to explain the phenomena where playing full backs on their strong side is axiomatic. The description functions perfectly within the current paradigm and is optimal for clarity. The question becomes then, why the overwhelming predominance of strong footed full backs to the extent they have become unquestioned – a dangerous situation to be in theoretically.
My hypothesis is, that they are best for direct central access when working under the inverted winger paradigm. The overlapping manoeuvre not only creates space for the interiour player, typically the player who has the qualitative superiority in attack over his teammate at full back thus making him have central access more pertinent. But also, deep in the final third, because the opposition increasingly prioritise compactness, quick actions are necessary, and when playing a through ball, a direct central pass diagonally slicing through the oppositions line’s is difficult and less frequently seen compared to going around the opposition’s line’s or finding a pocket of exploitable space for a more vertical pass. But space will nonetheless be closed down quickly enough for adjustment of body orientation to be facing goal to be too difficult. In these (diagonal passes cutting through a defence) optimal shooting scenarios are usually transitional before the attacking and defensive sides have committed numbers which means the inverted player typically starts wider and moves inwards to receive despite the consolidated possession bias towards their half-space focus. Tangent aside, full backs then typically face passes which are around (a defence) and where their body orientation leads to their same-sided foot having the central access due to the time difficulty with inverting which means this low-time actions suite same-sided strength.
However, Manchester City are showing that this common route of infiltration is potentially not the most conducive to maintaining control of a game through increasing the consolidation of possession as against more defensive sides, in particular those which acquiesce deeper possession. The issue with the paradigm then comes with the of direct caveat in the statement “that they are best for direct central access when working under the inverted winger paradigm”. To expand, an overlap is quite often a transitional commitment whereas, often the point of the deeper infiltration in the underlapping midfielder tactic is to go backwards to gain time + space for the later action which intuitively seems more dangerous as it actively moves the opponents compactness rather than into it while it also integrates a greater rotational element (not necessarily, but typically, given the low levels of narrow full-backs) and the centrally discombobulating underlap discussed here, which reinforces the central/far-side aim of the near-side overload. Elaborating further, an overlap disorients the wider region primarily, which while having a central benefit through drawing a wide player, does not discoordinate the centre to the same extent, while nonetheless presenting a direct threat via a cross if unfollowed. However, underlaps pose that same threat when done by a ‘strong-sided’ midfielder à la Bernardo Silva, while undermining central coordination to a greater extent – which can be exploited directly by the full back in possession through using the increased time afforded by the penetrative run to cut inside and expose the central spaces as exhibited in the earlier example. City then are able to regularly expose the opponents attempted compaction on the underlapping player as through initially provoking a defensive retreat, Cancelo can hit an in swinging cross towards Gabriel Jesus.
A potential issue which occurs to me, particularly when under pressure, however, is the reduced option of the easy pass up the line which Tuchel presumably wanted his players to avoid inferring from the training session. This may seem odd; however, thus far I have talked about the advantages when the full back gets enough time and space to cut inside to find central access because much like other inverted players facing inside-to-out pressing, the opportunity does not instantly present itself while it additionally potentially cuts off wider passing options who can be used to escape the opponent’s pressure through going around. This worry then is transitional, because wide consolidated possession is difficult, if not impossible to hold successfully because of constrainment opportunities. My concern then lies with the negation of up-back sequences where the wide player is used to generate central access through going around the opposition to exploit the now lack of cover shadow for the player the line behind. This player was only accessible because his width when going in-to-out passing made generated space for him to receive, with the opposition covering mechanism likely being tight marking pressure from the full back which primarily serves to prevent direct progression.
The outcome I think will be an increased tendency to go backwards to find the central access as the opponent cuts lateral and progressive options centrally, meaning the ball will be used to move the opposition to find gaps. Depending on opponent, this more attiritonal style which prioritises possession over direct transition could lead to reduced pressing efforts as fewer opportunities for turnovers arise while energy is being expended in areas where constraining and generating at least numerical equality is difficult because of expected active goalkeeper participation. To a certain extent, it reveals the interconnectedness of football and the externalities of decisions such as the primary foot (or more so relative proficiency as comfortability with both even if there is a stronger still permits greater adaptability) as it can determine not only the dynamics wanted fostered in wide areas i.e., underlapping midfielder, as David suggested in his article strong-sided wingers (although seeing the Grealish dynamic this season has convinced me fully on a central infiltration, overload to isolate dynamic) but also how you seek to beat an opponent more abstractly, in whether you attempt riskier progression attempts or attempt to consolidate control and more subtlety manipulate opposition positioning and tendencies to find a breakthrough.
However, a negation to this general hypothesis is that through automatisation which itself is a large commitment should you want to retain the transitional nature of playing out sequences (the ‘wrong-footed’ full back even without automatism does not preclude transitional styles I should note, rather assuming conventional pressing, I think it makes it more difficult directly due to opposition existing central compactness following inside-to-out pressing). Inter Milan for example showed last season the potential benefits of having a player like Ashely Young there to find the centre via automatisms as that reduces the time + space required in possession through conferring superior knowledge (Automatism Theory). These permit what can be colloquially referred to as automatised hoofs, where a dropping central player attempts to access the space available in between the 2nd and 3rd centre lines which are typically a consequence of pressing deep in the opposition’s half. From this the ‘wrong-footed’ full back plays which seems like a hopeful ball into a central area, seemingly lacking options for the central player to be the recipient and then gain central control for a transition to expose the oppositions ball-sided pressing commitment. Nevertheless, I should add, Inter’s attacking sequences predominately occurred down the right flank where up-back sequences could more readily occur, although, there are qualitative (Milan Škriniar, Achraf Hakimi, Nicolò Barella and Romelu Lukaku) reasons behind that which can make abstracting a general tactical principle difficult.
Overall, I see potential in the ‘wrong-footed’ full back because I feel football is moving in a direction where greater control provided by central access is beneficial in addition to preferring overload to isolate scenarios to typical crossing or crossing caused retreat then to move backwards scenarios. The former is lower value while the latter achieves what a midfielder underlap does with a greater latency period on capitalisation of the time and space offered by a defensive retreat hence partially negating its effectiveness. This should not be taken as an absolute statement of superiority or a disregarding of the benefits of more traditional dynamics but rather an exploration into different potentials which potentially appeal to my biases of preferring controlled possession and opposition transition negation. Potentially discernible throughout this post is that the proper formulation of the advantages, disadvantages or to use value neutral phraseology, effects, of the ‘wrong-sided’ full back is still nascent theoretically. So, I invite any addition to the discourse on the subject.
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