What do Manchester City, Chelsea, Roma, Red Bull Salzburg, Lazio and the New York Red Bulls have in common? The answer may seem puzzling at first glance. In this context, we refer to the way these teams, among many others, feature two ‘tens’. This tactical theory piece dives into the attacking benefits of this setup.
By tens, we are talking about advanced attacking playmakers who look to play between the lines of the opponent’s midfield and defensive lines. This is the role we have traditionally seen all-time greats such as Francesco Totti, Juan Román Riquelme and Roberto Baggio play to perfection and that has been lovingly called number 10, enganche, or trequartista in certain parts of the world (read more here on our love for the trequartista). Most often, they played this role on their own, usually backed up by a double pivot in midfield in a 4-2-3-1 or a 3-4-1-2 or even by a midfield three in a 4-3-1-2.
In recent years, we have seen a surge in teams deploying two tens, largely thanks to the popularity of the 3-4-2-1 system made mainstream by Antonio Conte’s Chelsea, Thomas Tuchel’s Borussia Dortmund and Gian Piero Gasperini’s Atalanta. However, tens are also being used by teams playing very different systems, such as 3-5-2, 4-4-2 or even 4-3-3. This piece will highlight a few of these teams.
Why two tens?
In the last four or five years, the main attacking development has been the insistence from many teams to attack in a line of five in the final third. Often, this line of five is created with attacking structures organised in a 2-3-5 or a 3-2-5 based on whether you use two or three centre-backs. For instance, this is what we have seen Manchester City do under Pep Guardiola when they used a line of five with Raheem Sterling on the right, Kevin De Bruyne in the right-sided halfspace, Sergio Agüero in the central corridor, David Silva in the left-sided halfspace and Leroy Sané on the left wing.
In general, this setup is created to attack back-fours with the line of five having each ten positioned between two defenders (full-back and centre-back). By nature, this positioning creates an issue for the defenders and questions which of them steps up to press the ball. As seen below, if the full-back steps in, the wide player can attack unmarked. If the centre-back steps out, the centre-forward can attack the vacated space.
A player in the halfspace between the lines can cause a lot of problems for a back-four.
Another important tool for an attacking team is the possibility to perform halfspace switches of play. These are very beneficial for an attacking team due to a number of reasons. Firstly, switching the play from one halfspace to the other keeps the ball (most often) within the opposition’s defensive structure. As such, the ball is in uncomfortable positions for the defensive team.
Secondly, the switches can be performed a lot quicker than going across into the wide area. Most often, the switches can be made along the ground rather than in the air as would usually be the case if switching play to the opposite wing. This means that the receiving player will probably be able to receive and attack the defence quicker than if bringing down a ball in the air. A wide switch will, as a consequence, give the defensive team more time to shift across and regroup, while a halfspace switch will make it tougher for them to deal with the new point of attack.
An example of a halfspace switch: the ball is played from right to left and the receiving player can instantly attack the defence from a position within their defensive structure. As a result, the problems discussed above appear again for the defensive side.
Halfspace switches often require a player being positioned in the opposite halfspace, which brings us into the next benefit of deploying two tens ahead of a balanced setup behind the ball: passing options. Setups like 2-3-5 or 3-2-5 provide the attacking team with multiple central passing options whilst also retaining options on each wing. However, teams playing in this manner see no need for two wide outlets on each side, instead preferring to maximise the number of players they have in central areas. More central passing options increase the possibility of keeping the ball in the opposition’s half since passing lanes are shorter and, therefore, easier. Crucially, the team is connected in that each player will always have one or two players in support nearby.
In addition, having more central players in connected positions increases the possibility to recover possession quickly when the ball is lost, which is why teams that strongly emphasise counter-pressing often flood the central areas with players in staggered shapes. If we return to the formation above and imagine that one of the tens loses the ball, that player will be backed up by two midfielders when trying to recover the ball. Of course, this can increase the pressure on the opposition’s ball-carrier and remove nearby passing options to break out of the space immediately around the ball.
Finally, setups with two tens playing between the lines provides a coach with the chance to field more creative players in central areas than if by only using one ten. As a result, the teams I will look at now all include at least two creative playmakers that would likely be pushed wide, deeper or to the sidelines if only playing with a sole creative player.
Guardiola’s Manchester City – ‘free eights’
Let’s start by looking at Pep Guardiola’s swashbuckling Manchester City who have used all kinds of structures during his tenure. One of their most famous, and successful I might add, was their use of a 2-3-2-3 (or 2-3-5 if you prefer) when both full-backs moved into midfield and Kevin De Bruyne and David Silva pushed up to play as double tens, or “free eights” as De Bruyne once put it. In other games, only one full-back would move inside and the other would stay back to create a 3-2-2-3 (3-2-5) instead but the idea of having two tens remained.
City’s 2-3-2-3/2-3-5 with De Bruyne and Silva as two tens.
Perhaps most importantly, this setup allowed City to trademark the goal we all think of when we think of Guardiola’s City: the low cross from either halfspace channel. Due to the winger often drawing out a full-back, the ball-near ten could attack the space between full-back and centre-back (see image below). Since many teams want their midfielders to track this run rather than a centre-back moving out, City could create a dynamic advantage since they would attack this space at pace. Furthermore, the back-tracking midfielder would already be on the wrong side of the ten, making it even more difficult to stop this attacking pattern.
City’s trademark attacking pattern, particularly in the 2017/18 season.
Tuchel’s Chelsea and Fonseca’s Roma – 3-4-2-1
If City’s tens appeared in those positions due to rotations, their Champions League final opponents next week have their tens positioned there naturally. In Thomas Tuchel’s favoured 3-4-2-1, players like Hakim Ziyech and Mason Mount start in those positions and look to receive and draw out opposition defenders in the same way City do/did. Furthermore, their shape naturally creates the five-man attacking line we see so many teams deploying. With two creative playmakers behind the striker, as well as players like Jorginho and Mateo Kovačić often appearing in the double pivot, Tuchel has managed to get a lot of quality passers into the team to balance the dynamism and running with the ball of N’Golo Kanté.
Chelsea’s 3-4-2-1 naturally deploys two tens behind the striker.
As a result of this setup, Chelsea’s possession approach has been very impressive ever since the German took charge. With a player as dynamic as Mount, that number ten role also includes the type of deep runs De Bruyne has trademarked at City.
Another side that has made clever use of creative players is Paulo Fonseca’s Roma. Particularly in the first half of the 2019/20 season, Fonseca’s 4-2-3-1 out of possession morphed into a 3-4-2-1 in possession (for more on their tactics, check out this video based on a piece I wrote for Total Football Analysis). This was done by the right-back staying in the first line to form a back-three while the left-back pushed high. The left winger Henrikh Mkhitaryan would then move into the left-sided halfspace while the sole number ten, Lorenzo Pellegrini, would move into the right-sided one. This created the shape seen below.
Roma rotated to create a line of five with two tens in the halfspaces.
Just like City and Chelsea, Roma managed to create an attacking line of five when attacking their opponents.
Inzaghi’s Lazio – 3-5-2
While the three solutions discussed above are surely the most common right now, there are other ways of deploying two tens as well. Below, I’ll discuss three of these. While most teams that do this look to create the aforementioned line of five in attack, Simone Inzaghi’s Lazio are different. They have often created a line of SIX, either as seen in the image below or in other games organised in a 5-1 (with one striker used as a third ten).
Chiefly, the idea seem to have been to overload teams playing with a back-five, which many teams in Italy have done against Lazio in recent years. The structure was usually created by the two mezzale Luis Alberto and Sergej Milinković-Savić moving high into each halfspace either side of the two forwards. As a result, and highlighted in the image below, Lazio created passing options even between the five defenders they were up against.
Lazio’s use of double tens as part of an attacking line of six players.
Additionally, Lazio could push Milinković-Savić into the box as a third option for crosses to equal the number against the opponent’s three defenders, reducing the benefits of fielding three centre-backs as the advantage of having an extra man was lost. While being more susceptible to counter-attack with worse balance in midfield, Lazio have been among the top scorers in Serie A every year for the last five years so it has evidently worked for them in some games.
Marsch’s Red Bull Salzburg – 4-2-2-2
Across the Alps, we find another intriguing use. I have already written about Jesse Marsch’s Salzburg in more detail here, but, in his 4-2-2-2, he has also made use of two tens. While usually defending slightly wider, these players would move into the halfspaces to create 4v2 or 4v3 overloads in central areas to facilitate quick, vertical passing combinations with the two central midfielders and strikers. There would be no constant wide threat pinning full-backs, but the very vertical nature of Salzburg’s football has meant that teams very rarely had time to block these spaces before the likes of Takumi Minamino or Dominik Szoboszlai had received passes and progressed attacks.
Marsch’s double tens in a 4-2-2-2.
Struber’s New York Red Bulls – 4-Diamond-2
Finally, the last example comes from the MLS where Gerhard Struber’s New York Red Bulls have used what has looked like triple tens as both wide midfielders in their 4-Diamond-2 have pushed into these areas either side of the classic number ten. This has created attacking structures such as the one below with one full-back high and the other tucked inside. Naturally, this has meant opportunities for quick passing combinations and good counter-pressing situations have been plentiful.
Struber’s 4-Dimaond-2 with two tens.
While not retaining a constant wide threat as the setups City, Lazio, Chelsea and Roma have done, the Red Bulls have seemingly tried to get as many players as possible into central areas and then attack wide areas dynamically rather than statically.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is safe to say that a number of setups including the use of two tens are apparent in modern football. Increasingly, more teams are adopting similar attacking setups to these ones and it will be intriguing to see how sides develop defensive counter-proposals to this attacking trend. The result can only be fascinating tactical battles as teams fight for supremacy in the spaces that matter and, for now, the use of two tens is proving both difficult to stop and highly successful.
Did you like the piece? Follow DaveSelini and @RunTheShowBlog on Twitter.
Comments