There are games every now and then where you see a team completely dominating their opponent and record a comprehensive victory. That was certainly the case on Sunday night as Peter Vermes’ Sporting Kansas City defeated the Vancouver Whitecaps 3-0 on Children’s Mercy Park. The hosts had 26 shots and enjoyed 68% possession on top of the convincing scoreline. In honesty, it could have been five or six. This tactical analysis will look at the attacking tactics that allowed for Sporting KC to dominate in such a way.
In particular, the tactical analysis focusses on Sporting KC’s build-up methods, rotational movements and use of a false 9. Sporting KC pressed and counter-pressed really well to help them achieve dominance too, but this tactics piece only looks at their play in possession.
Teams
Sporting KC head coach Peter Vermes’ team lined up in a 4-3-3 with Tim Melia in goal behind a defence made up of, from the right, Graham Zusi, Ilie Sánchez, Andreu Fontás and Luis Martins. The 18-year-old Gianluca Busio anchored the midfield with Roger Espinoza to his right and Gadi Kinda to his left. Up front, Khiry Shelton and Dániel Sallói flanked the centre-forward Alan Pulido.
Vancouver started in a 4-4-2 with Maxime Crépeau in goal, a back-four of Jake Nerwinski, Ranko Veselinović, Derek Cornelius and Cristian Gutiérrez, and a midfield quartet of Ryan Raposo to the right, Janio Bikel and Caio Alexandre in central midfield and Déiber Caicedo to the left. Up front, Lucas Cavallini and Cristian Dájome partnered each other.
KC’s build-up play
It was clear from the off that the Whitecaps would have to find a way to deal with the excellent Gianluca Busio to stop KC playing out effectively due to the numerical 3vs2 advantage in central midfield and the fact that Busio could create a 3vs2 with the centre-backs against the Whitecaps’ first pressing line. However, they failed to deal with this threat. Sporting KC were very successful in their aim to build from the back and often created structures as highlighted in the image below.
Sporting KC progressed the ball smoothly thanks to their setup which saw Busio establish a 4vs2 against the Vancouver strikers when KC built from the back.
In the image below we can see this structure in an in-game example. Melia, Ilie, Fontás and Busio created a 4vs2 to beat the press and progress the ball up the pitch.
When the press was broken and Sporting KC could establish possession higher up the pitch, they created the positional structure seen below. This structure saw the right-back Zusi come inside to create a back-three with Ilie and Fontás while Martins pushed high. In return, the right-winger Shelton stayed wide while Sallói moved inside more on the left.
And here’s another example of this shape with the right-back Zusi (yellow) central, right-winger Shelton (white) wide on the right and the left-back Martins (orange) high on the left.
In this way, KC maintained their 4vs2 advantage against the Whitecaps strikers when higher up the pitch. This provided the base for KC to keep possession for long spells as they could always come back with the ball to a very stable foundation when needed. As a result, the Whitecaps really struggled to press them effectively. The image below highlights one such example as Zusi breaks the press by playing into Busio.
On the occasions when the Whitecaps reacted and decided to only press with one striker and let the other mark Busio, KC would react and create a traditional back-four shape as Zusi now moved wide, as seen below. The two centre-backs still had a numerical advantage against the lone presser, so there was no need for three players in the first line.
As a result of this, KC looked to free up one centre-back for him to be able to step out with the ball. We can see this in the image below when Ilie has played the ball across to Fontás, who has a lot of space to step into. The Spanish defender took this opportunity and stepped out with the ball to ask a new question for the Whitecaps to answer: who presses me? When stepping out with the ball, the centre-back could create 2vs1 situations with the full-back against the opposition winger, again allowing for smooth progression of the ball.
The Whitecaps strikers caught on KC’s right side as the ball is switched across, allowing Fontás to step into the huge space in front of him.
In general, Sporting KC’s build-up play in their own half was excellent and the Whitecaps failed to get to grips with the positioning and superb passing of the home side.
Rotations and movements
Sporting KC’s positional structures in their own half were impressive but not revolutionary. However, their rotations and general movements in the attacking half were very intriguing. Mainly, Sporting KC seemed to work according to the principle of balancing movements. In essence, this involves players reacting to the movements of their teammates to maintain a presence in the most interesting spaces for the side. As an example, if a winger moves centrally, a central midfielder can balance this movement by then moving wide which provides a central option (the winger) while also maintaining a wide presence (the central midfielder).
For instance, the movements seen below appeared often. These involved Shelton moving inside from the right, with Espinoza then balancing this movement by moving wide. On the opposite side, Sallói often started wide but moved inside when Martins pushed up and Kinda would often push forward when Pulido dropped away from the Vancouver defensive line.
Below we can see an in-game example of this as Pulido drops from the front, Kinda pushes on, Shelton comes inside and Espinoza moves wide on the right.
In the image below, we see the central midfielder Kinda (yellow) out wide while Sallói (white) has moved centrally.
Winger central, central midfielder wide.
In the below situation, the right-back Zusi has pushed high and wide to balance Shelton’s inverted movement.
Winger central, full-back wide.
Another key movement of KC’s attacking play was to get players into the spaces between Vancouver’s defence and midfield. Most often, this would be done by Kinda or Espinoza moving high into these positions, or Pulido dropping in, as I’ll discuss later. The image below highlights how this could look. Here, Busio plays the ball into the feet of Kinda, who can instantly turn and progress the attack. He is helped massively by the inverted positioning of the two wingers who pin two defenders each, preventing anyone to step out and press/mark Kinda. As a result, KC could establish a positional superiority between the lines.
The wingers move inside to pin four defenders, opening up space between the lines for others to exploit.
Kinda was excellent in getting into these positions between the lines and KC were very good at playing the ball into these spaces too. We can see one such scene below where Fontás threaded a pass through the lines into the feet of Kinda.
One last aspect of KC’s positioning that was key to their performance was their ability to double up on Vancouver’s full-backs in the wide areas. This was done mostly on the left with Sallói staying wide until Martins had moved up alongside him. As the play was then switched across, KC had a 2vs1 advantage against the Vancouver right-back. We can see this setup in the image below.
KC doubling up on their left wing.
With the ball in the wide areas, KC could then attack the box with a lot of central options. Below, with the left-back Martins (yellow) in possession, Sallói could make one deep run, Kinda another, Espinoza would attack the box, Shelton would come across and Pulido (if he hadn’t dropped out) could attack the box too.
As a result, crosses became a huge problem for the Whitecaps as it was not uncommon for the KC attackers to outnumber the defenders. One such example can be seen below as Shelton, Pulido and Kinda outnumber the defenders 3vs2.
Largely, Sporting KC’s positional structures and clever rotations and movements created so many weapons that Vancouver could not manage. There would always be players attacking depth, there would always be central options and always someone wide – it was just never the same players stood there. This made it almost impossible to defend when adding the intensity and quality of the KC side.
Pulido as a false 9
I’ve already touched on it but the role of Alan Pulido was very intriguing. The Mexican striker performed a false 9 role; that is, he regularly dropped off the front to link play between the lines, establishing a 4vs2 advantage in central midfield in the process. With Busio, Kinda and Espinoza already overloading Bikel and Alexandre in midfield, Pulido could often drop in completely unmarked to receive progressive passes from the defenders. One such scene is the one below where Pulido made himself available to receive from Fontás.
Pulido, as a false 9, would regularly drop into midfield to pick the ball up in dangerous areas.
When Pulido dropped, as in the image below, someone else needed to provide depth. Most often, this was done by the two wingers moving inside as in the image above, or by a central midfielder moving higher. Of course, this is another aspect of KC’s emphasis on balancing movements. These movements also helped form passing triangles and diamonds for the ball carrier. The image below is a great example of this as Fontás on the ball has a progressive option to his left, right and straight forward.
Here, Pulido drops into midfield as Kinda has vacated the space by moving higher. In a way, they replace each other and balances each other’s movements.
The inverted movements of the wingers really helped Pulido to pick the ball up in dangerous spaces. We can see this in the image below as the positioning of Sallói next to the Whitecaps’ centre-back allows Martins to play the ball into a forward-facing Pulido between the lines.
Sallói pins the centre-back, creating space for Pulido to receive in.
As mentioned, others needed to provide threats in behind when Tolido dropped off and we can see this again below. Here, Martins prepares to play a cross but Pulido (yellow) is not in the box. Instead, Kinda and Espinoza has pushed forward while Shelton also attacks the box. The deep run from Espinoza is difficult to pick up and leads to a great chance when he meets Martins’ cross.
Pulido had an excellent game in which he scored two goals and also assisted Sallói’s opener. He performed his role brilliantly and duly reaped the rewards of a convincing performance.
Conclusion
In summary, Sporting KC thoroughly deserved their win and proved utterly dominant over the 90 minutes. 26 shots, 68% possession and an xG of 4.06 tell you all you need to know. The dominance was achieved by their excellent pressing and counter-pressing as well as their very fluid and interesting attacking play. The long-serving coach Peter Vermes has really managed to instill some principles and dynamics into the team which he deserves huge credit for.
This tactical analysis of Peter Vermes’ tactics has focussed on just that and the build-up structures, rotations, movements, positioning and use of a false 9 were all key components behind their impressive display. Sporting KC are now third in the Western Conference and it will be interesting to follow how they continue to perform this season, so keep an eye out for them.
Like tactical analyses like this one? Follow me on Twitter @DaveSelini and @RunTheShowBlog
Comments