The transfer window slammed shut on Monday night and, as has become the norm in the last seven years, Manchester United fans were disappointed with the business the club conducted over the summer. After completing the signing of Dutch international midfielder Donny van de Beek earlier in the window, United concluded deals for Brazilian left-back Alex Telles from Porto, Uruguayan veteran striker Edinson Cavani, his 18-year-old compatriot Facundo Pellestri from Peñarol and Atalanta’s highly-rated 18-year-old winger Amad Diallo. On the opposite side of the spectrum, Chris Smalling (Roma), Alexis Sánchez (Inter), Andreas Pereira (Lazio) and Diogo Dalot (AC Milan) left the club, the latter two on loan deals.
Most United fans feel the club’s manager, Ole Gunnar Solskjær, hasn’t been properly backed since it was obvious he and the club wanted to sign Borussia Dortmund’s exciting 20-year-old England international Jadon Sancho but balked at the German club’s price tag of €120m. While critial voices would argue that United spending €40m on a rotation option in midfield (van de Beek), €10m on an unproven 18-year-old winger from the Uruguayan top-flight (Pellestri), an initial €21m with a further €20m in add-ons for an 18-year-old with only three substitute appearances in Serie A (Diallo) and an expected €10m in agent fees for the free transfer of Cavani could have been better used to sign Sancho, a proven Bundesliga, Champions League and international star at only 20, United have certainly strengthened their squad, if not the starting eleven. What has got fans riled up in regards to the Sancho deal is United’s apparently bewildering approach to negotiating with Dortmund (highlighted in this piece from The Athletic) when it was clear to everyone that the club had made Sancho their primary target of the summer. Additionally, when the deal didn’t happen, United adopted a chaotic scattergun approach on deadline day looking for other options, failing to land either Ousmane Dembélé or Ismaila Sarr. Instead, United will return after the international break with Daniel James, Jesse Lingard and Juan Mata as competition for Mason Greenwood, a centre-forward himself, on the right wing.
Furthermore, most United fans have screamed for a new centre-back and a new defensive midfielder but United haven’t looked likely to sign in those two positions with all the attention apparently turned towards bringing Sancho to Manchester. United did sign a left-back as many fans wanted them to, and Telles will most likely be an upgrade on Luke Shaw who has looked out of place at the start of the season. Telles is a fantastic left-back going forward, but will be tested defensively in United’s chaotic defensive setup.
And that brings me to the purpose of this article: United’s tactics. All the analysis around how United can get closer to winning a first league title since 2013 has circled around the fact that the club needed to sign more players. While true to an extent, United did look weak in defensive midfield and central defence last season as well as having no natural option on the right wing, United’s main area of weakness is the actual coaching.
Looking at the squad, United have three international centre-backs (Bailly, Maguire and Lindelöf) who all should be doing better than what they are, they have a right-back in Aaron Wan-Bissaka who is brilliant in 1v1-situations but struggles positionally, a left-back in Shaw whose defensive positioning is all over the place, a midfield that is blessed with talent but unbalanced and dependent on an ageing Nemanja Matić to cover for the attacking talents of Paul Pogba and Bruno Fernandes, and finally an attack with some of the most exciting attacking talents in the Premier League who shine due to their individual ability and not as part of a functioning attacking set-up as there are still issues with the balance of attack, notably effecting Marcus Rashford’s performances. For any coach or tactically-inclined fan reading this, you will sit there thinking “well, yeah, but those issues are easily eradicated through effective coaching”. Bingo. My point exactly.
Fixing the defensive system
Manchester United had one of the best defensive records in the Premier League last season, a result of Solskjær often adopting a quite cautious defensive approach which saw United defend in a compact manner with lots of players behind the ball following a positionally-orientated system. Teams would be invited to cross the ball where Maguire would prove his worth by often dominating the penalty area aerially. With Scott McTominay and Fred, two tenacious and aggressive midfielders, playing most of the pre-lockdown games in front of the back-four together or one of them with Matic, United also had great support for their defence with two central midfielders excelling with their ball-winning and pressing attributes rather than their work in possession.
Post-lockdown, when United continued an unbeaten run that started in January, Solskjær welcomed Pogba back into the team and paired him with Matić in midfield with Fernandes playing just in front of them, demoting McTominay and Fred, neither of them a true holding midfielder such as Matić, to the bench. By all of a sudden having their three best passers on the pitch, along with the superb form of Greenwood and Anthony Martial in particular and a fit-again Rashford, United scored more goals than at any point under Solskjær and looked a better team going forward, which helped them dominate games and easen the burden on the defense. Still, there were occasions when the team looked fragile defensively, especially against Bournemouth, Southampton and West Ham, all at Old Trafford.
During his soon-to-be two years in charge, Solskjær has never demonstrated an ability to create any sort of structured attacking play, instead relying on the talents of his attackers. That is fine, if not something I think can be successful over time, as long as other aspects of your tactics work. For instance, the deeper defence and quick counter-attacks United used in every big game under Solskjær, particularly in the derby wins against Manchster City and in the game that got him the permanent job, the extremely unexpected and fortunate Champions League win at PSG. Solskjær’s United has never been attacking, they’ve been solid defensively and then had wonderful attacking players hitting good form at roughly the same time. The issue has been that when those players’ performances have dipped, United haven’t been able to get the results their fans expect. Furthermore, United have always struggled to break down deep-lying defences under Solskjær, highlighting his inability to create a succesful attacking model of play.
The 4-2-3-1 United now use is very attackingly balanced with four players (Greenwood, Fernandes, Rashford and Martial) who rarely drop into covering positions, instead waiting higher up the pitch to hit teams on the counter-attack when the ball is turned over. This is clearly Solskjær’s plan since the pace and quality of those four make United deadly on the break. However, this setup also means more defensive responsibility is handed to Pogba and Matić who are either positionally ill-disciplined (Pogba) or lacking the energy and mobility to cover all the space they have to (Matić). This means the compact shape we saw for much of last season has ceased to exist with the current team incredibly open, leading to more and larger spaces for the back-four to handle. Solskjær and his coaches aren’t stupid, of course, and has instead moved the defensive line higher and instructed the attackers to start pressing higher up the pitch. Sadly for Solskjær, the press if often uncoordinated and sees Wan-Bissaka, the only United defender with the pace required to defend large spaces, push high up the right to support the press. Teams then often go long into the space behind Wan-Bissaka, beat the poorly organised press to find a central option or go long behind the defensive line where the remaining defenders struggle to defend large open spaces as well as attackers running at them at speed.
The solution seems simple: go back to creating a solid defensive shape, for example a 4-4-1-1 out of possession if Solskjær wants to stick with the 4-2-3-1 in attack and drop a little deeper to lessen the burden on the likes of Lindelöf, Maguire and Matic. It could make United less dangerous on the break as Rashford and Greenwood will start from deeper positions but it would make the team so much more solid and would help to improve their defending massively. It could also be argued that positioning his wingers deeper would invite opposition full-backs to move higher, thus opening up space behind them for said wingers to attack.
Alternatively, United could change their defensive shape into a 4-3-3 with Fernandes and Pogba playing either side of Matić. That would mean Pogba’s poor positioning wouldn’t be as much of a problem while Fernandes has already played in that position at Sporting. There is also a case to be made around potentially including McTominay/Fred over Pogba in certain games to help increase the defensive solidity of the side.
Improving the attacking balance
The arrival of Bruno Fernandes revolutionised Manchester United last season and the Portuguese playmaker was integral to United eventually finishing third. However, his presence in the team has impacted on Rashford’s game. Basically, when United attack they push Wan-Bissaka high on the right, meaning Greenwood moves inside into the right-sided half-space. On the opposite side, Fernandes often drifts towards the left-sided half-space and leaves the ten-space unoccupied to open up passing lanes into Martial, who excels in those situations. However, Fernandes’ movement means the space Rashford wants to cut into is already occupied by Fernandes and, more often than not, the opposition midfielder covering Fernandes. This means Rashford can only stay wide, away from danger and forced to go on the outside, or come inside which then clusters the central space with too many players (Fernandes, Martial and Rashford) in a very condensed space. With Shaw offering next to nothing going forward from left-back, United’s threat down the left has diminished.
United have no natural right-sided attacker, which is why the links to Sancho made sense. With Sancho playing wide on the right, Wan-Bissaka, who often struggles in attack, could have adopted more of a supporting Gary-Neville-to-David-Beckham role. Fernandes could then have drifted towards the right instead, with Rashford free to cut inside on his favoured right foot without Fernandes and opposition players already standing in that space. Of course, Sancho didn’t arrive, so United must try to solve their unbalanced attack with the players they’ve got. Again, this is a question of coaching.
I won’t pretend that I know exactly how good Alex Telles is defensively, but I know that he is great going forward, and his crossing ability will, in particular, add a new dimension to United’s attacking play. Cavani, who is excellent in the air, will probably be the main beneficiary of that aspect of Telles’ game. What is clear with Telles is that he is an attacking left-back who supports attacks down the line rather than in a more inverted role. Thus, United must alter their attacking balance slightly.
Marcus Rashford showed last season what an exciting, and effective, player he is when he runs at players. However, post-lockdown, this aspect of his game has largely disappeared (his marvellous Brighton goal excluded, when he ruined them on the counter-attack) with Rashford often receiving the ball in congested areas and opting to largely stand people up and look to play incisive passes. This isn’t his game. He likes to pick the ball up in a wide position and then attack the right-back at pace. More often than not, he will cut inside to either shoot or combine. This will mean Telles should be the perfect partner for Rashford to dovetail with. It seems obvious that if Telles can start lower and then overlap outside Rashford when the Mancunian faces forward, United will all of a sudden have a doubled threat down the left. That combination hinges, though, on the positioning of Fernandes.
What Solskjær could do is simply change the side Fernandes drifts towards. With Fernandes in the right-sided half-space and Greenwood out wide, Fernandes would be able to play the diagonal pass in behind that Rashford loves to run on to. Greenwood is more suited to intricate play in tight areas than Rashford, and would likely struggle initially in a wider role but, crucially, he can still come inside, just a little later than what he is doing now. This would allow him to arrive in dangerous areas rather than stand in them, and his combination play makes it certain that he and Fernandes can combine in more condensed areas. Fernandes, for his part, often played to the right for Sporting. This would also create a very strong triangle of Pogba, Fernandes and Greenwood on the right where United could overload attacks thanks to the trio’s excellent abilities in tight spaces before switching attacks to the left where Rashford and Telles would attack at pace.
Another option would be to go to a classic 4-3-3 with Pogba on the left but positioned in front of the opposition’s midfield to allow Rashford to come into the left-sided half-space while Telles provides width whilst Fernandes would play to the right of Matić.
Additionally, Solskjær needs to find a way to stop counter-attacks against his team. One way of doing this is by setting the team up in a way that sees the team position themselves in a way designed to stop counter-attacks when possession is lost, a so-called “rest defence”. United are never well set up to deal with counters which is why we often see the likes of Lindelöf and Maguire being caught in difficult positions. Since United’s counter-pressing is erratic at best, this is a huge problem for the team.
Whatever United do, Solskjær must make sure he gets the most out of his individual players if he is to continue with an attacking setup that is only based around the quality of his players to create something out of nothing. Having Rashford in a more natural role would go a long way towards improving the attacking potential of the side since a Rashford in form has proved to be crucial for United in the past.
Improving individual players
A large part of the job of a manager is to improve his players. To do that, it’s vital to understand what the players need to improve on. There is a distinct sense that Solskjær isn’t improving his players. Wan-Bissaka is a good example. It is clear to everyone that he is limited going forward and, crucially for a defender, struggles positionally. With most players, the easisest thing to improve is positioning. All you need is a system to adhere to in order to provide structure and then it’s about repeatedly working on these aspects in training. Clearly, this isn’t happening with Wan-Bissaka, whose positioning is deteriorating. He has shown in the past that he can play in an organised defensive system, as his time under Roy Hodgson proved. Going back to earlier in this article, Solskjær must find an organised defensive system as soon as possible, and coaching Wan-Bissaka to understand where he should position himself when crosses come in, for example, is crucial to United’s defending going forward.
The same issues can be found in Shaw’s defensive game (which I detailed here 18 months ago for Total Football Analysis), so it seems obvious that United’s coaching staff should spend hours on end working on defensive positioning with the whole team in general but also their back-four in particular.
Rashford suffered a long injury lay off last season and his struggles to resume the same form can obviously be said to connect to that as his back injury might have hampered his mobility and/or confidence. It is Solskjær’s job to make Rashford soar like he did last fall/winter but instead his tactical setup seems to have diminished Rashford’s influence and worsened his overall game.
Improving individual players is key to the success of any manager since you can’t always rely on new signings to come in. The players at Manchester United are good. They need to be coached well in order for them to succeed, and if Solskjær can’t do that then someone else should replace him.
Bring in other coaches
To be successful at United, Solskjær doesn’t have to be great tactically as long as his staff are. If Solskjær can’t create a functioning attacking system, then he should hire a coach who can. It’s obvious that United’s current coaching staff can’t create attacking patterns to make the team dominate games when certain individual players are out of form so, for his own sake, Solskjær needs to bring in other coaches. This talk of the mythical “Man United DNA” sits well with some fans and might have some bearing in the day to day life at the club, but it doesn’t impact on how the team is prepared tactically. Solskjær needs a staff who can create the tactical structure the team can fall back on when Fernandes, Rashford and Pogba have off-days, like all players have, because if neither he nor his coaches can provide that tactical structure, he will lose his job.
Conclusion
Finally, this article has argued that Manchester United have actually had a poor transfer window but Solskjær, pundits in the media and United fans can’t blame the team’s obvious tactical shortcomings on Ed Woodward’s failure to sign Jadon Sancho, a centre-back or a defensive midfielder. Players alone won’t win you titles, because you need a tactical structure to fall back on as a team when the individual stars aren’t on song. For Solskjær, this means that he needs to overhaul his spacious, unorganised and front-heavy defensive system and create the sort of compact, deeper-lying defence he’s shown himself capable of creating. He also needs to alter a few things to make his individually-focused atacking play work better (or hire a coach who can help him create a more structured way of attacking) and start improving individual players through coaching. That way, United can get out of this chaotic slump they have entered and probably go on to finish in the top four for a second successive season.
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