On Sunday, Thomas Tuchel and Ole Gunnar Solskjaer faced off for the first time in the Premier League after several tactical battles in the Champions League in the past. I’ve seen Tuchel’s smart pressing schemes described at other sites, but not much has been made of Solskjaer’s impressive tactical plan. This tactical analysis will look at his interesting pressing system and the attacking tactics that saw Mason Greenwood interpret the lone striker role in an interesting way.
Teams
Lineups: Chelsea’s 3-4-2-1 versus United 4-2-3-1.
Chelsea started in the 3-4-2-1 they’ve used regularly under Tuchel. Édouard Mendy started in goal and the back-three in front of him was made up of captain César Azpilicueta, Andreas Christensen and Antonio Rüdiger. N’Golo Kanté partnered Mateo Kovačić in midfield with Callum Hudson-Odoi and Ben Chilwell as wing-backs. In attack, Hakim Ziyech and Mason Mount acted as the two tens behind Olivier Giroud.
Solskjaer opted to continue with the 4-2-3-1 he’s used much more regularly this season than in previous season when he often has changed to a 5-2-1-2 in away games against top teams. Aaron Wan-Bissaka and Luke Shaw started either side of the defensive partnership of Victor Lindelöf and Harry Maguire. Crucially, Scott McTominay was declared fit to start and he was joined in central midfield by Fred. In front of them, Daniel James continued on the right with Bruno Fernandes in the centre and Marcus Rashford on the left. Up front, Mason Greenwood was chosen in an interesting choice that brought intriguing results, as I will discuss later.
United’s pressing tactics
Straight from the off, it was evident that United had worked on their pressing tactics during the week leading up to the game. For starters, United’s wingers James and Rashford were positioned much more narrow than they usually are. This made sense since it created easy access to Chelsea’s wide centre-backs whilst there was no real reason to have two players in wide areas due to Chelsea only having their wing-backs down the sidelines. The narrow positioning of the wingers also helped Fernandes deal with Chelsea’s double pivot, allowing McTominay and Fred to essentially man-mark Mount and Ziyech.
Most importantly, United could push their defensive line high to facilitate a high press since they had no real threat in behind to worry about since Giroud hardly had an edge on either of the centre-backs in that department. The image below highlights United’s nominal starting positions when Christensen was in possession. Fernandes would press which ever Chelsea pivot that wasn’t covered by Greenwood’s cover shadow when the young striker went to press Christensen.
On the occasions Christensen passed the ball to the unmarked wide centre-backs, United’s wingers would press aggressively. In the image below, we can see how Azpilicueta receives the ball and is pressed by Rashford. Kanté moved towards the ball which meant that Fernandes looked to block passes into the Frenchman. As such, the ball-far pivot, Kovačić in the situation below, was free. This seemed to be a plan from United and if the ball was played there, the United winger, James in the case below, would back-press aggressively to try and nick the ball from behind. As you can see, United’s overloads suggest a ball-oriented approach with elements of man-orientations (the roles of Fernandes, Fred and McTominay, for instance).
As you can see below, the setup was the same on the opposite side. Rashford didn’t back-press as well as James did, which saw Chelsea sometimes escape through Kanté. On both sides, United’s full-backs were very aggressive in pushing out to press Chelsea’s wing-backs while the rest of the team overloaded that side. Crucially, McTominay and Fred continued to block access to Mount and Ziyech.
The scene below highlights how United overloaded around the ball. As Chilwell received the ball and was pressed by Wan-Bissaka, the rest of the United side overloaded the space around the ball. As such, United left the opposite side underloaded so that if Chelsea could get out and switch sides to Hudson-Odoi, they could threaten down the right with crosses across the box, which they did with, particularly, Giroud’s chance in the first half. However, United also created numerical advantages around the ball, which led to many occasions of ball recoveries.
All in all, United demonstrated an interesting way of pressing a 3-4-2-1, particularly how to deal with the 4 v 5 underload against Chelsea’s back-three and double pivot. They won the ball back repeatedly and impressed with their high pressing against a difficult opponent, which was stark contrast from how they’ve approached these types of games in the past. With a little better quality in the attacking transitions, United could have made their good pressing count in terms of goals.
The role of Mason Greenwood
The other main tactical take away from a United perspective was the role played by Mason Greenwood. The 19-year-old was (finally) given another chance to start up front for United. When given minutes in that position in the past, Greenwood has showcased his ability to drop off the front to connect with midfielders but also to receive the ball, turn, and then run at the defence. Against Real Sociedad last week, viewers could hear Solskjaer scream “Mason, central!” when Greenwood dropped into the half-spaces on either side, but, at Stamford Bridge, Greenwood dropping into half-spaces was definitely part of the plan.
As we can see in the image below, Chelsea pushed Kovačić up to press McTominay when United tried to build from the back. Mount would also look to press outwards on Wan-Bissaka as soon as Lindelöf released the ball to the right-back. The high positioning of these two meant that there was space in the right-sided half-space for Greenwood to drop into, which he did to good effect.
Naturally, since the Chelsea back-three had no one else to mark, Rüdiger would often push up when Greenwood dropped off. This created space for Fernandes and James to run into. It must be said that Christensen dealt very well with these situations and United didn’t create anything of note from these passages. It seemed clear, though, that this was something they had worked on, with Greenwood dropping off and then the other attackers aggressively attacking the space behind.
When Greenwood’s dropping movements did not lead directly to a forward pass, his movements helped United retain possession under heavy pressure. After the ball reached Greenwood, Kovačić was forced to collapse which obviously freed up McTominay to receive a lay off from Greenwood. McTominay could then, theoretically, switch sides or just circle the ball centrally.
In the final third, Greenwood continued to drop off the front. Again, Rashford and James would look to attack the space behind the Chelsea back-three. This must have been a conscious pattern United had worked on, since Greenwood’s dropping movements lead to the Chelsea defence push up slightly and, if United had had more quality in their passing in these areas, runs into depth against a forward-moving defence can be devastating.
It didn’t come off on Sunday, but it will be interesting to see how United go on from here. With the poor form of Anthony Martial, it seems obvious that Greenwood should get more chances in the position everyone around the club seems to think he will eventually make his own. His understanding of space increases the connectivity of United’s attacking play, and his ability to turn or dribble out of tight areas can be good options to help United build attacks from the depth more efficiently.
Conclusion
Solskjaer has rarely been praised for his tactical ability, but, as this tactical analysis has shown, he impressed on Sunday by coming up with a clever pressing system and a very promising role for Greenwood. The caveat is that Solskjaer has seldom been able to build on the tactical patterns he has instilled at times. If the can continue to approach big games with smart pressing tactics like this system and if Greenwood can flourish in a more central, connected role, Solskjaer might be on to something.
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